Brubaker (1996). Nationalizing states in the old ‘New Europe’ – and the new.

Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalizing states in the old ‘New Europe’ – and the new. In Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (pp. 79-106). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

[“Nation-building and nationalization” (p 80) …]

[“The old ‘New Europe’: nationalizing states in the interwar period” (p 83) …]

[“Interwar Poland as a nationalizing state” (p 84) …]

“The new Polish state, therefore, was conceived as the state _of_ and _for_ the ethnolinguistically (and ethnoreligiously) defined Polish nation, in part because it was seen as made _by_ this nation against the resistance of Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews.” (p 85)

“The assimilation of Germans and Jews, however, was generally viewed as unlikely (in the case of Germans, especially those living in territories ceded by Germany after the war) or undesirable (in the case of Jews). Policies toward them were therefore more ‘dissimilationist’ or ‘differentialist,’ based on differential treatment by ethnocultural nationality among citizens of the Polish state.” (p 86)

[“Nationalizing the western borderlands” (p 86) …]

[“Nationalizing the urban economy” (p 93) …]

[“Nationalizing the eastern borderlands” (p 97) …]

“Belarusians and Ukrainians occupied no desirable economic or political positions from which there was any interest in excluding them. They were recognized — while Germans and Jews were not — as autochthonous; no one sought to encourage them to emigrate.” (p 98)

“The major exception to this eastern pattern was in eastern Galicia. Unlike the rest of this zone, which had belonged to the Russian Empire, Galicia had been a Habsburg province, with Poles predominating in its western, Ukrainians in its eastern half. There, for half a century before the First World War, conditions for cultural and even political nationalist mobilization were much more favorable than they were in the more authoritarian Romanov territories. Consequently, a strong Ukrainian nationalist movement developed, led, as everywhere, by an urban intelligentsia, but mobilizing the peasantry as well, and generating, by the outbreak of the First World War, a more deeply rooted sense of national identity.” (p 98)

“While it was widely believed that Germans could not and Jews should not be assimilated, the assimilation of Belarusians and Ukrainians was seen as both possible and desirable, even as necessary. … The Belarusian and Ukrainian inhabitants were overwhelmingly rural; their concerns were overwhelmingly economic, not national. Their identities were seldom, and then only weakly, articulated in national terms. Some identified themselves simply as _tuteshni_ (‘from here’).” (p 100)

“Yet far from furthering the assimilation or even securing the loyalty of borderland East Slavs, Poland’s inept nationalizing policies and practices in the interwar period had just the opposite effect, producing by the end of the period what had not existed at the beginning: a consolidated, strongly anti-Polish Belarusian and — to an even greater extent — Ukrainian national consciousness. This happened through heavy-handed efforts to nationalize the land, the schools, and the churches of the region, and through the harsh repression of Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalist and social-revolutionary movements.

“Although it had assimilationist aims, the new state’s land policy in the eastern borderlands employed differentialist, discriminatory means. Just [page break] as the nationalizing German Kaiserreich had sought to Germanize the lands of its predominantly Polish eastern borderlands by promoting ethnically German at the expense of ethnically Polish landowners — through state sponsorship of what was forthrightly called ‘colonization’ and state control over land sales — so the nationalizing Polish state pursued similar policies _vis-à-vis_ Belarusians and Ukrainians, settling soldiers and other Poles from western territories on estates in the eastern borderlands; indeed Poles were well aware of the parallels between the national struggles in the German-Polish and those of the Polish-East Slav borderlands. Yet just as the German colonization program provoked sustained Polish opposition (and was in any event ineffective), so too the Polish colonization efforts, while only marginally affecting ethnic demography and land ownership, powerfully antagonized the local, land-starved Belarusian and Ukrainian peasants.” (p 100-101)

“The Ukrainian university that had been envisioned when Poland was seeking Allied approval of its claims to Galicia was not established, and the existing Ukrainian-language chairs at Lwów (Lviv) University were abolished. … numerous Belarusian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches were closed down, or pressed to use Polish liturgical texts.” (p 102)

[“Coda: nationalizing states in the new ‘New Europe'” (p 103) …]

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